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 Overlapping claims in the South China Sea has turned into a 
contested zone for global powers to project their roles in the region. Given 
the political uncertainty in international affairs, states prefer to acquire their 
own national interests for the sake of nations’ prosperity. Indonesia, one of 
regions’ prominent actors committed to be a non-claimant state in the 
dispute, is trying to invigorate cooperation through its maritime vision 
notably known as ‘’Global Maritime Nexus’’ despite region’s security 
dilemma. It aims to enhance mutual opportunities for all actors involved at 
the dispute thereby diminishing any possibility of the worsening power 
competition. Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as one of 
regions’ most prominent multilateral organizations is expected to be a 
cornerstone for a more peaceful dispute settlement so it could move forward 
on fostering members’ prosperity and security. However, Indonesia is a 
sovereign state which must hold their national interests at stake when it 
comes to any international affairs. It is therefore becoming a challenge for 
Indonesia on pursuing national interests while maintaining its neutral 
position as non-claimant state at the same time.   
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Introduction 
 The recent massive land-reclamation activity done by China on the 
Spratly Islands in the South China Sea has alarmed many countries engaged 
in Asia Pacific region. However, China insisted that maritime reclamation 
has been part of their life since other countries like Japan has been fortifying 
the Okinotiri Islands and demanded an exclusive economic zone but the 
United States has been silent on this matter (Huaxia, 2015). ‘’Nine-dashed 
line” claimed by China which embraces some 80% of the South China Sea 
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is described as China’s historic waters. This claim has raised an awareness 
of its neighbour as they believe that they are also entitled to advance natural 
resources and other potential at the region. Sovereignty claims and energy 
vulnerability become the two major factors which exacerbate the dispute.  
As a sea which holds huge amount of potential energy resources, thus it 
potentially becomes one of the most protracted conflict zones in Asia 
Pacific where both regional and international players try to assert their 
unequivocal primacy over the disputed area. There are at least six countries 
with their interests at stake at the competing territorial and jurisdictional 
claims in the South China Sea; China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, 
and the Philippines. Among all claimants, China persistently plays the most 
of aggressive behaviour proven by the military build-up and public 
statement by Chinese officials in regard to their reluctance to external 
parties’ engagement, the United States (U.S.) for instance, in the dispute. On 
the other hand, U.S. argued that they have underwritten regional security for 
decades patrolling Asia’s sea lanes and preserving stability therefore their 
presence in playing a more contributive roles in the region is needed 
(Clinton, 2011). Notwithstanding the fact that U.S. was never truly absent 
from Southeast Asia, the ongoing commitment to its regional allies, and 
overwhelming maritime military presence – the perception that U.S. role in 
regional affairs was declining since China was ascending cannot be easily 
dismissed  (Anwar, 2013).  
 At the height of global power projections, Republic of Indonesia as 
one of ASEAN’s founding fathers who has been actively promoting the 
principle of non-alignment or notably known as its “non-block” approach in 
international affairs, has tried to become pioneer in mitigating the potential 
risks surrounding the region such as initiating the discussions on the 
formulation of Declaration of Conduct (DOC). However, as a sovereign 
state, Republic of Indonesia must also have its national interests at stake 
despite its commitment to contribute on peace and security formation on 
both regional and international affairs. On October 2014, Indonesia’s newly 
elected President Joko Widodo has announced a new top priority in terms of 
foreign policy concern emphasizing on the importance of maritime power 
through officially announced vision of “Global Maritime Nexus” (GMN). 
Through this vision, Indonesia is expected to play a more contributive role 
in the formation of regional security and economic. Pursuing national 
interests while maintaining its neutral position as non-claimant state would 
be a potential challenge for Indonesia. 
 This article is structured as follows. Firstly it will explain the global 
power projections in the South China Sea involving U.S. and China. 
Second, it will try to portray Indonesia’s interests in the region despite its 
status as non-claimant state, noting a number of economy and security at 
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stakes. It will finally explain the significance of maritime vision invigorated 
by Indonesia towards the maritime boundary dispute in the South China 
Sea. My argument on whether or not Indonesia through its maritime vision 
could maintain neutrality despite global power projection in the South China 
Sea goes to three significant points. First, Indonesia will strive to maintain 
good relations with all claimant and non-claimant states involved at the 
South China Sea dispute in order to pursue national interests at stake.  
Second, maritime vision could become a strategy to enhance unity among 
members on Indonesia’s closest priority at regional basis, ASEAN, in order 
to enhance benefits for ASEAN members. Third, this could further reduce 
the height of great power projection in the South China Sea due to the 
establishment of potential shared opportunity through cooperations. 
 
I. 
 The South China Sea dispute which covers the Pratas Islands in 
northeast, the Paracels in north, the Spratlys in south, and Scarborough 
Shoal in central east has abundant natural resources and trade potential 
thereby it is critical for countries surrounding to think about benefit from 
this area as the means of pursuing national interests. In the unpredictably 
world constellation where no state can rely on other’s assurance in 
maintaining security, maximizing defence strategy might be best applied by 
state in ensuring their interests. Thus, China’s effort in doing reclamation 
for any purpose may be taken into account as the logic effort to maintain 
interests at stake. However, problem has started to rise up when there has 
been no agreed consensus among all claimants. The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the generally accepted 
customary international law is considered as the only credible framework 
within which any kind of exclusive claims can be made despite the fact that 
the United States have failed to ratify it (Evans, 2015). China seemingly 
prefers bilateral layer discussions in mitigating the dispute instead of 
through multilateral layer such as by ASEAN. It can potentially lead to the 
imbalance power in negotiation since China’s growth militarily and 
economically may be such a worrisome to others smaller states. Given the 
fact that two region’s most prominent multilateral bodies members‘, 
Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), involve into the dispute as 
claimants; Vietnam and the Philippines, therefore it raises a big concern for 
ASEAN to take an initiative step through peaceful arbitration. However, 
delimitation of maritime boundaries plus the hitherto obscure over the land 
remains present since there is no agreed law-abiding regulation among all 
claimants thereby dispute is seemingly conceivable (Hayton, 2014). The 
latest negotiation process formulated into Code of Conduct initiated by 
ASEAN member states have brought into such an enormous progress 
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towards conflict settlement despite the fact that China keeps doing that sort 
of aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. However, solutions and 
problems should be based on law but unfortunately it is not always clear 
which international law should be adopted (Djalal, 2014). Indonesia, one of 
ASEAN’s biggest members considers about the need of maintaining a 
peaceful order in regional security more importantly when it comes to any 
dispute dealing with sovereignty claims and energy vulnerability. As of 
October 2014, Indonesia’s newly elected President Joko Widodo has 
announced a new top priority in terms of foreign policy concern 
emphasizing on the importance of maritime power through officially 
announced vision of “Global Maritime Nexus” (GMN). Through this vision, 
Indonesia is expected to play a more contributive role in the formation of 
regional security and economic.  
 Research and attempts pursued by both academicians and think-
tanks in order to examine state’s national interests have been helpful in 
obtaining the significance of maritime power as one of defense strategy 
tools. Started from the basic assumption of world politics according to 
neorealist which believed that an anarchic international system is a source of 
conflict, thus state faced a condition to which they need to make sure that 
they are safe from other state’s intention.  In order to strive a security 
attainment from any plausible attack, both groups and individuals living 
such a constellation are therefore driven to acquire more and more power in 
order to escape the impact of the power of others (Herz, 1950).  Thus, 
maximizing efforts to prepare for the worst circumstance led by insecurity is 
rising as no state can be certain about their security at stakes. I would argue 
that this action is justifiable as long as it does not threat other neighbours. 
Therefore, Jervis’s findings that an increase in one state’s security decreases 
the security of others, notably known as central point of security dilemma 
(Jervis, 1978) might be taken into account in understanding the basic idea 
on analyzing state behaviour on security matter. Nonetheless, I believe that 
one state’s security increase is not only decreasing others’ security but also 
themselves in the first beginning. Once state ‘A’ increases their security 
preponderances by the means to make them safe from other’s attack, it will 
trigger other states, name it state ‘B’ to therefore feel insecure due to its 
vulnerability thereby implying them to increase security as well. It will in 
return increase state vulnerability and automatically decrease its security.  
 International system which consists of states and organization 
established imply to the existing anarchic system, for it lacks an overarching 
supranational government, but is not chaotic thereby system is defined by its 
key actors, their interactions, hierarchies of power, and influence among 
them (Clemens, 1998). As the consequence of uncertain strategic situation, 
security dilemma is formed as a type of insecurity dinamic between states 
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thereby state’s knowledge of the other state’s motives is important in order 
to engage in the worst-case scenario planning (Glaser, 1997). Geoffrey Till 
coined an idea that sea power holds four historic attributes intimately 
connected with each other, and each also exhibits the same cooperative and 
conflictual tendencies characteristics of international relations as illustrated 
in the figure below (Till, Seapower, 2004) 
 
RESOURCES                                        MARITIME COOPERATION  
TRANSPORTATION                                   
INFORMATION 
DOMINION                        
                                                               CONFLICT & COMPETITION  
     
 
 
Figure 1.    The Four Historic Attributes of Sea 
 
 Given the fact that sea possesses a huge amounts of resources 
providing high road to prosperity, the need of making the most of it also 
increases.  In order to get enormous profits, it is important to make sure that 
a highly developed technology for transportation is applied. Furthermore, 
making sure its safety from such threats is another crucial point which needs 
that sort of sharing information with other actors playing within. However, 
dominion is seemingly inevitable since actors hold maritime strategies as 
Till further argued include assuring sea control, projecting power ashore in 
peace and war, attacking and defending trade, directly and indirectly, and 
maintaining good order at sea. Finally, naval roles will depend on the scale 
of either maritime cooperation or conflict and competition which potentially 
arise.  
 
Global power projections in the south china sea 
 The South China Sea has turned into an area where contested 
primacy of major powers plays. The notion of US Rebalance to Asia vis-à-
vis China Peaceful Rise which has been predominantly marked by mistrust 
often leads states to face security dilemma. It is therefore reflected in the 
defence strategy in order to ensure countries’ interests from being taken by 
others. However, leaning to one side is not an option for Indonesia to 
maintain their security at stakes.  
 NAVAL 
ROLES 
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Figure 2. Map of disputed area in the South China Sea  (Economist, 2015) 
 
 Picture above depicts the disputed area which has increased states’ 
security level in the region. If parties involved keep assert their power 
leverage through for instance China and its reclamation at Paracel Islands, I 
would predict a conceivable predicament surrounding the South China Seas 
could grow worse in the couple years ahead.    
 
US Rebalance to Asia  
 One of the most illuminating statements delivered by US Secretary 
of Defence Ash Carter on his remarks on the next phase of the U.S. 
Rebalance to the Asia Pacific is: 
 ‘’Asia Pacific is the defining region for our nation’s future given a 
few data points: half of humanity will live there by 2050, even sooner by 
2030 more than half of the global middle class and its accompanying 
consumption will come from there, and there is already home to some of 
world’s largest militaries and defence spending.’’ (Carter, 2015).  
 After U.S. ages war in Middle East, U.S. is now thinking about pivot 
point in Asia since it is considered as one of the key drivers of global 
politics. However, China’s rise has therefore led U.S. to think about 
strategic implication which implies into the increase of military presence 
which U.S. has in the region. This condition of security dilemma which 
occurs due to an uncertainty in international relations has worried U.S. so 
that expanding military presence is a critical thing to do in order to secure 
their interests at stake in the region. U.S. engagement in the region is seen in 
their involvement in the establishment of APEC Leaders’ Meeting and other 
form of cooperation such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN plus 
Three, and East Asia Summit. This form of cooperation could be interpreted 
as insecurity dynamic reflection in U.S.’ strategy by knowing other state’s 
motives better so that they could engage in the worst-case scenario planning 
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due to the rise of China. U.S. also needs to ensure their energy security as 
Kent Calder, an American scholar has argued that the ‘’radical energy 
vulnerability’’ of key states in the region and the rise of China as both ‘’an 
emerging superpower and an emerging competitor...for potentially tight 
regional energy supplies’’ compounds the potential for energy to become a 
“catalyst for regional conflict” (Calder cited in Stares, 2000). It therefore 
suggests the idea proposed by Till (2004) on how resources drives state to 
either engage in any sort of maritime cooperation or conflict and 
competition. U.S. somehow plays a seemingly more balance action by 
establishing cooperation despite the fact that this condition might trigger 
competition in the region due to the unbalance economic power between 
U.S. and other Asia Pacific regions mostly developing states.  
 
China Peaceful Rise 
 China as one of regions’ wealthiest country still needs its 
dependence on imported sources of energy. Since 1993 they have been a net 
importer of oil and since 1996 has become a net importer of crude oil. The 
major Asia Pacific sources were Indonesia (6.30 Mt) and Vietnam (1.01 Mt) 
and it will likely continue to grow in the future (Shixian, 2000). Table below 
illustrates the energy net import projections of China:  
 Unit 2000E 2010E 2015E 
Energy Net Import Mtce 27.00-33.37 124.04-146.41 226.23-291.13 
Coal Mt 2 4 5 
Oil Mt 35.00-40.00 90.00-103.00 125.00-145.00 
Natural Gas Bm3 1.2-2.0 17.0-22.0 60.00-90.0 
Figure 3. The energy net import projections of China 
Source: Author’s projection based on China’s statistical Yearbook 2010 (Shixian, 2000) 
NOTE : Coal net import is minus; it refers to net export 
 
 E: Estimate; bm3: billion cubic meters, Mtce: million tons of coal 
equivalent; Mt: million tons.  
 This situation, in turn, will contribute and complicate the problem of 
existing maritime boundary dispute in the South China Sea as China’s 
heavily dependence on the energy import from Southeast Asia countries is 
facing U.S. who also asserts their rebalance in Asia, more specifically to the 
importance of future energy demand. It is worth noting that what is 
unfolding in Asia is a race between the accelerating dynamics of 
multipolarity, which could increase the chances of conflict, and the growth 
of mitigating factors which will dampen and improve potential continuing 
peace on the region (Friedberg, 1993-1994). The dynamic of security 
dilemma-driven action-reaction is seen in the economic and military 
competition which both US and China assert. Given the high tension of 
competition, both states actually need to make sure that their policy and 
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actions over the South China Sea is in line with the principle of peace. 
Miscalculation would lead into the risk of unintended escalation in the 
future. Even though China keeps insisted that they will never jump into the 
harsh conflict when it comes to any dispute, yet their behaviour through 
People Liberation Army (PLA) modernization and other assertive responses 
in the South China Sea showed that they hold huge amount of interests at 
stake there. Fu Ying, a spokeswoman for the National People’s Congress on 
March 3, 2015 stated that:  
  ‘’As a large country, China needs the military strength to be able to 
protect its national security and people as our history teaches us a lesson that 
when we lag behind, we come under attack. We won’t forget that. 
Furthermore, we need to continue modernizing armed forces since there was 
still a gap between us and other countries in terms of military equipment’’ 
(The Wall Street Journal, 2015)  
 It strongly depicted a possibility of arm races in the region which 
may involve China and U.S. as the regions’ most powerful actor. In regard 
to the South China dispute, China persistently shows an assertive behaviour 
seeing by the latest reclamation done in the Spratly Islands. This has raised 
U.S. concern by Republican Senator John McCain and Democrat Jack Reed 
who sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. Defence 
Secretary Ash Carter by stating that U.S. should build a strategy that 
includes measures to ‘’slow down or stop China’s reclamation activities 
there by whether releasing intelligence about this activity more frequently or 
stop certain types of security cooperation with China is they don’t stop 
(Brunnstrom, 2015). Indonesia as one of the natural leaders in the region 
tries to response the heightened power competition between U.S. and China 
in these particular situations by enunciating maritime cooperation which 
may lessen the possibility of great power projections in the region as states 
are more likely to cooperate instead of competing.  
 
Economic and security interests vis-a-vis non-claimant status   
 Indonesia has declared its position as a non-claimant state in regards 
to the South China Sea dispute. It is stated on Indonesian President Widodo 
statement in an interview with the Yomiuri newspaper:  
 “One of China’s claims to the majority of the South China Sea has 
no legal basis in international law, but Jakarta wants to remain an “honest 
broker” there. We need peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. It is 
important to have political and security stability to build up out economic 
growth. So we support the Code of Conduct (of the South China Sea) and 
dialogue between China and Japan; and China and ASEAN.”  (Widodo, 
2015) 
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 However, it does not literally mean that Indonesia has no interests at 
stake in the region as according to Lloyd national interests are the 
wellspring from which national objectives and a grand strategy flow (Lloyd 
cited in Sumakul, 2013). In order to prosper the nation, it is important for a 
country to safeguard their national interests which imply on the formulation 
of integrated defense and foreign policy. Indonesia has been playing an 
active role as honest broker during the dispute. Recent nine dashed line 
published by China has alarmed Indonesia as it overlaps with Indonesia’s 
EEZ and Continental Shelf. Indonesia’s vulnerable position is tested after 
China’s nine dashed line claim overlapping Natuna Island. In July 10 2015, 
Head of Indonesian State Ministry of Development Planning Andrinof 
Chaniago and Indonesian Ministry of Defence have agreed upon an 
establishment of military base in Natuna Island as the means to safeguard 
Indonesia territorial from any plausible threats due to maritime boundary 
dispute in the South China Sea (KOMPAS, 2015). It shows Indonesia’s 
effort to assert their naval roles in response to make sure its safety from the 
danger of power dominion at the sea.   
 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) sets out what maritime zones may be claimed from land 
territory, as well as the rights and jurisdictions of states in such maritime 
zones (Beckman, 2015). Indonesia has been actively contributing towards a 
dispute settlment through its role as third party. In its annual press 
statement, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi 
emphasized that through ASEAN, Indonesia will continue to actively 
engage for the full and effective implementation of Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), as well as the early 
conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (Indonesia, 
2015). In spite of Indonesia’s claim of not being a claimant at the dispute, 
national interests which are always detached in every country’s policy 
action drives Indonesia to concern on their challenges and opportunities in 
the South China Sea. When states are facing security dilemma, a condition 
in which they are unsure of other intention while at some points need to 
reassure their positions, they would formulate some sorts of policies which 
involve all resources to safeguard national interests. Indonesia, however, 
hopes to maintain good relations with two great powers as they get benefits 
from these bilateral partnership. There are three layers of benefit which 
Indonesia will get: (1) In the South China Sea, (2) Indonesia-U.S. 
partnership, and (3) Indonesia-China partnership.  
 First, South China Sea as the semi-enclosed zone holds a huge 
potential resources. Being in a line where four Sea Lines of 
Communications (SLOC) met, really makes Indonesia lucky. It would 
benefit the country if government could effectively maximize all potential 
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covering geographic, economic, as well as political as it has been enunciated 
in maritime vision through GMN. The rapid economic growth which 
increases in demands for gas and oil has increased the need for new 
resources for sustaining economic development (Sukma, 2010). Not 
surprisingly, South China Sea becomes one of the most contested lands due 
to the strategic position of chokepoints which becomes a critical part of 
global energy security because 63% of petroleum and other world’s oil 
production transported through maritime routes (EIA, World Oil Transit 
Chokepoints, 2014). Surrounded by six choke points notably known as 
Strait of Malacca, the Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait, 
the Ombai Strait, and the Wetar Strait which are all used for international 
navigations make Indonesia seems to be so lucky. Indonesia is now aware 
about the importance of prioritizing maritime sector as the strategy to 
allieviate nations’ power. Moreover, one-third of the world’s liquefied gas 
passes through the Straits of Malacca and into the South China Sea which 
becomes the shortest sea route between African and Persian Gulf suppliers 
and Asian consumers. U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that 
by the end of 2011, trade through Malacca was greater than 15 million bbl/d 
or about one-third of all seaborne oil (EIA, 2013). Thus, it becomes 
important for Indonesia to get benefits from this position for their trade and 
commerce lines. Apart from that, one of the biggest straits called Lombok 
Strait located in Indonesia is notably known as the wider, deeper, and less 
congested route than Strait of Malacca so that it will be beneficial for any 
trade routes. About 3,900 ships transit the Lombok Strait annually; the total 
tonnage carried by the Lombok Strait is 140 million metric tons worth a 
total of $40 billion (Ho, 2006). It is further argued that tankers which exceed 
200,000 DWT have to divert through the Lombok Strait due to the depth 
constraints of the Strait of Malacca.  
 Second layer which involves Indonesia-U.S. partnership as it is 
reported in the fourth Joint Commission Meeting of the U.S.-Indonesia 
Comprehensive Partnership on February 17 2014 will cover three pillars: 
political and security; economic and development; and socio-cultural, 
education, science, and technology (State, 2014). In supporting Indonesia’s 
maritime vision, this partnership agrees upon some points: the selling of 
Apache helicopters to Indonesia in support of Indonesian Armed Forces 
modernization efforts to more than $1.5 billion; Indonesia’s national oil 
company Pertamina announced a 20 year Liquid Natural Gas agreement 
with U.S.-based Cheniere Energy that would bring up to 800,000 metric 
tons per year of abundant U.S. LNG to Indonesia for the first time; and 
improving fisheries management. These patterns would surely bring better 
prospective investments for both sides given its economic and security 
benefits.  
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 Third layer involves mutual benefits due to Indonesia-China 
partnership. According to Rizal Sukma, Indonesian presidential adviser for 
foreign policy, there are at least three areas where Indonesia’s maritime 
agenda fills in or overlaps with the Maritime Silk Road ideas of Chinese 
President Xi Jinping namely connectivity, safety, and diplomacy (Gokkon, 
2014). In 2013 President Xi Jinping launched Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 
which envisages a maritime trade network stretching from Beijing, through 
Indonesian waters into the Indian Ocean and onto the Middle East and 
perhaps, as far as Europe in where Indonesia would become a major transit 
point for Chinese trade (Piesse, 2015). It will surely benefit both sides due 
to its maritime interconnectivity without disrupting the existing SLOC in the 
region. On March 25 2015, President Widodo at the invitation of President 
Xi Jinping has agreed on enhancing cooperation in these priority areas: (1) 
Political, defence, and security, (2) Trade, investment, and economic 
development, (3) Maritime, aeronautics, science, and technology, (4) 
Culture and social affairs, and (5) International and regional affairs (Affairs, 
2015). Under China-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation Fund (MCF), both 
agreed to strengthen practical cooperation in navigation safety, maritime 
security, maritime search and rescue, maritime scientific research, and 
environmental protection.  
 Despite its non-claimant status, Indonesia perceives a threat from the 
realm of balance of power in the Natuna Island thereby it is critical to strive 
for self-defence strategy as main strategy to maintain national interests. One 
of the most notable defense doctrines called “Dwi Darma Nusantara” which 
shapes integration of military component and non-military component has 
been useful in guiding GMN to defense, protect, and preserve Indonesian 
national interest. Indonesian national defense was built upon the principles 
of democracy, human right, public prosperity, environmental preservation, 
national law, international law and custom, and peaceful live side by side 
and observe the principle of independence, sovereignty, and social justice 
(Susanto, 2007). President Jokowi is widely known as new figure in 
Indonesia political stage despite his previous position as the governor of 
Jakarta. Compared to his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), 
who is a retired Army general, they have different focus of foreign policies. 
President Widodo’s maritime ambition in order to transform Indonesia to be 
a considerable maritime power in the region has been a powerful political 
commitment for Indonesian naval development which covers these 
procurement programmes: off-shore patrol vessels, naval aviation, air 
defence, maritime surveillance, and anti-submarine capabilities (Gindarsah, 
2014). It postulates Indonesia’s new defence commitment in alleviating its 
maritime strategy for the pursuit of country’s national interest. Even though 
facing security dilemma, Indonesia prefers to have maritime cooperation 
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instead of conflict and competition without forgetting the role of naval to 
safeguard the country. Therefore it proves the first argument on how 
Indonesia is aimed at maintaining good relations with all great powers while 
at the same time pursuing national interests at stake.  
 
The significance of maritime vision towards maritime boundary dispute 
in the south china sea  
 Jalasveva Jayamahe” (in the ocean we triumph) slogan of Indonesian 
navy was reiterated by President Widodo in his first presidential speech on 
October 20, 2014. His obstinacy is supported by the appointed Indonesia’s 
first coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Indroyono Soesilo, who 
will then assume oversight for the ministers for transport, tourism, energy, 
and fisheries (Neary, 2014). It is also strengthened by choosing Tedjo Edy 
Purdijatno, a navy man, in order to be Coordinating Minister for Security of 
Republic of Indonesia in Widodo’s government and the establishment of 
new ministry called Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs. GMN 
strategy, announced by President Jokowi in his speech in East Asia Summit 
in Naypyidaw 2014, will be undertaken through five key actions covering 
maritime diplomacy to solve border dispute, safeguarding Indonesian 
maritime sovereignty and security, securing Indonesian natural resources, 
intensifying defence diplomacy, and reducing maritime rivalries between 
major powers through resolution of regional territorial disputes (Neary, 
2014). One of the most important points on GMN concept concerning the 
South China Sea dispute is stated by Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Retno Marsudi which signalled the intention of Indonesia to give more 
contribution through bilaterally driven and self-interested approach on 
diplomacy. It will be applied through continuing pressing on the completion 
of code of conduct in South China Sea between China and ASEAN (Kemlu, 
2015).  This vision can be considered as Indonesia’s strategy to play a more 
contributively role in regional basis while pursuing national interests at the 
same time. As ASEAN leaders, Indonesia is a strategic place for any sort of 
international commerce fleeing in the region. In order to apply this policy, 
there has to be coordinating policies around ministries to articulate the grand 
design of GMN for instance Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Defence, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Ministry of 
Transportation, and last but not least Indonesian Navy. Nevertheless, after 9 
months of inauguration, each of the ministry involved in that vision has not 
released any official blueprint in regard to GMN implementation. In order to 
respond to the challenges, four broad tiers of decision-making are 
particularly important: policy making at the level grand strategy, grand 
strategy making, military policy and strategy making, naval policy and 
strategy making (Till, 2015).  
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 Living in the midst of great power projections, Indonesia faces 
security dilemma which leads them formulating GMN as the means to 
reduce vulnerability and escape the impact of the power of others as Herz 
(1950) argued on the point of striving security attainment from any plausible 
attack. Despite all challenges, GMN offers a fresh air to the better 
opportunities for countries surrounding to cooperate. Beckman (2015) 
believed that the only viable prospects for resolving the maritime boundary 
disputes in the South China Sea would be for the Claimant States to enter 
into Joint Development Agreements (JDAs) which spell out the right of the 
claimants states to exercise rights to resources in the areas subject to the 
JDAs. ASEAN countries will benefit from the maritime cooperations if the 
vision of GMN is fully integrated by the shared opportunities on maritime-
based trade and investments. One of the most prominent events which 
Indonesia will soon engage is their chairmanship role at the IORA (Indian 
Ocean Rim Association) in 2015.  As Till argued on his historical attributes 
of the sea that transportation and information need to be taken into account 
in order to enhance maritime cooperation, Indonesia through its 
chairmanship in the IORA will therefore promote the advanced economic 
diplomacy through sea power. Indian Ocean will then be projected as the 
pearl for benefitting countries surrounding. There are some significant 
points proposed in the National Workshop on the Preparation for 
Indonesia’s Chairmanship in IORA which was held on February 25 2015 at 
the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; such as the issues on security 
and maritime safety, disaster risk management, trade facilitation and 
investment, fisheries management, academic and science, as well as the 
tourism and cultural exchange (Marsudi, 2015). All of these points are 
important in strengthening maritime vision and therefore alleviating the 
number of cooperations among countries in the region. Indonesian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi further argued that as a middle power 
country, Indonesia’s membership in the IORA is not just about what it gets, 
but rather what contribution can Indonesia give for the organization and 
world. Furthermore, ASEAN Economic Community implemented in 2015 
will become the platform to enhance cooperation as well as investment in 
ASEAN members. The implementation of Roadmap towards an Integrated 
and Competitive Maritime Transport in ASEAN will strongly be suggested 
to benefit its members (ASEAN, 2008).  
 However, Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) remains 
Indonesia’s cornerstone of its foreign policy as described as ‘the first 
concentric circle’ thereby promoting the idea of an independent Southeast 
Asia capable of maintaining its autonomy in the face of rivalry is an 
important task to do (Sukma, Indonesia and the Emerging Sino-US Rivalry 
in Southeast Asia, 2015). Both Track One and informal Track Two 
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diplomacy efforts have been conducted in order to solve the dispute through 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the discussion of Code of Conduct to 
formally discuss the matters between China and ASEAN in spite of 
Chinese’s participation; while the Track Two Workshop was initiated by 
Indonesia to develop dialogue, confidence building, and concrete 
cooperative efforts and networking in the South China Sea (Djalal, 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: Lessons Learned , 
2001). Despite ASEAN’s principle of non-interference when it comes to 
other internal affairs (Severino, 2000), the embarrassing silence with a six-
point consensus in the recent standoff between China and the Philippines 
over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea during Cambodian 
chairmanship on the foreign ministers’ meeting has raised Indonesian sense 
of rescue to hammer out the six points of agreements (Emmerson D. K., 
2012). In regard to the dispute, China has made series of compliments sent 
by the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations with reference to the 
Republic of Philippines Note Verbale no. 000228 on Spratly Island (in 
Tagalog : Kalayaan) which strengthened that:  
 ‘’The so-called Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) claimed by the 
Republic of Philippines is in fact part of China’s Nansha Island...The 
Republic of Philippines’ occupation of some islands and reefs of China’s 
Nansha Islands as well as other related acts constitutes infringement upon 
China’s territorial sovereignty’’ (DOALOS, 2009). 
 On the other hand, the split among ASEAN members seems to be 
real. Indonesia who believes on the principle of ‘’independent and active’’ 
tried to be an honest broker after Indonesian former Foreign Minister 
Natalegawa successfully persuaded Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor 
Namhong to read six-point consensus reaffirming all ASEAN foreign 
ministers’ commitment to observe the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea and follow the guidelines for its implementation. 
Moreover, they also need to work together toward an early adoption of a 
Code of Conduct to strengthen the 2002 Declaration; to exercise self-
restraint and avoid threatening or using of force; and to uphold the peaceful 
settlement of disputes in keeping with United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea or UNCLOS (Emmerson D. K., 2012). Split within its 
members is seen in Cambodia seemingly succumbing to China while U.S. 
supports to the Philippines through defense partnership may help them 
enhancing national interests. Meanwhile Malaysia, despite its status as 
claimant state, and Brunei agreed on maintaining some sort of cooperations 
with China. In June 2013 Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak called 
for South China Sea claimant states to develop resources in order to protect 
freedom of navigation and the safe passage of shipping while Brunei and 
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China agreed to carry out joint exploration and exploitation of maritime oil 
and gas resources (IISS, 2013). It depicts a fact that the South China Sea 
would become a test for ASEAN unity in the regional architecture. If this 
fuzzy situation remain stagnant, ASEAN could end up abdicating 
responsibility for managing its own regional problems to big external 
problems  (Baviera, 2012). Consensus which becomes ‘’ASEAN’s way’’ of 
settling dispute can sometimes be difficult to be achieved as some countries 
seemingly satisfy their own interests. For a consensus to be absolute, 
however, all parties must share the same concerns and be willing to sacrifice 
part or all of their interests for the common cause (Nguyen, 2012).  
 Thus, the second argument on how maritime vision could become a 
strategy to enhance unity among ASEAN members suggests a condition that 
if all members agreed on sharing the same concerns in regard to the South 
China Sea dispute. As a consequence, the regional architecture would be 
stronger that later is expected to diminish the potential of great power 
rivalry in the region. In regard to the heightened global power projection in 
the South China Sea, some states remain benign as they see more beneficial 
parts on the potential maritime cooperation while others think about the 
danger of conflict and competition. At the ASEAN Regional Forum in 
Hanoi in July 2010, Secretary of State Clinton laid out seven principles 
guiding the US government’s policy toward the South China Sea. All of 
these principles are known to provide foundation, though not the sum total, 
of US interests in the region; these are: (1) Freedom of navigation, (2) 
Freedom of overflight, (3) Unimpeded commerce, (4) Peaceful resolution of 
dispute and abstaining from coercion, (5) Conforming claims to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, (6) A collaborative diplomatic process to 
resolve territorial dispute, and (7) Negotiation of a Code of Conduct. 
(Bader, 2014) 
 In order to ameliorate security dilemma, Lindley argued states can 
focus on such steps; increasing transparency and reassurance in order to 
reduce anarchy-induced uncertainty by sharing information about each 
side’s interpretation of the other’s actions (Lindley cited in Liff, 2014). 
However, there is no guarantee that by expanding transparency and 
reassurance could diminish all possibilities of potential dispute. This 
strategy works effectively if only all states bound into that sort of formation 
agreed upon shared consensus or legal foundations. U.S. who has not 
ratified UNCLOS yet brings an image on how US is not commitment into 
the major legal basis of settling dispute even though US insists their 
peaceful approach would be prioritized instead of arms racing there while 
China seems to be reluctant in implementing the signed Code of Conduct. 
Security dilemma is something inevitable as each country must have their 
interests at stake. The important point is on how these interests do not 
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overlap and harm other countries through that sort of dominion which might 
lead into conflict or competition. The idea of cooperation should rest on the 
equal profits enjoyed by all parties involved. Even though it is not a 
panacea, Indonesia’a maritime vision through GMN could become a way to 
at least reduce the heightened global power projections and to further avoid 
the risk of making the South China Sea as the area for contested primacy 
between U.S. and China. Here are several reasons why Indonesia’s maritime 
vision matters to provide a “buffer” solution amidst the height of great 
power projections. First, maritime vision as Indonesia proposed through 
GMN will postulate an idea that economic cooperation would be enhanced 
in order to bring benefits for all countries surrounding such as those bound 
into ASEAN as well as U.S. and China. Therefore maintaining good 
relationship among all actors engaged will be prioritized for the sake of 
mutual benefits. Jervis (1978) argued that statesmen who do not understand 
the security dilemma will think that money spent is only cost of building up 
their arms. It is further argued that adopting more conciliatory posture like 
meeting the other’s legitimate grievances or developing mutual gains from 
cooperation can somehow increase state’s security. Economic cooperations 
will lead interdependence. If one country has dependence on other, and of 
course this is driven by national interest, they would therefore seek to 
maintain a good relationship. Second, maritime security cooperation will 
provide a space for both great powers and ASEAN members who are mostly 
developing states to discuss about security threats that they are facing. 
Considering ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as multilateral forum, it may 
be able to help creating a ‘situation of equilibrium’ among the major powers 
through the creation of norms an habits of cooperation as to some extent, the 
ARF is more about engaging the U.S. as engaging China (Acharya, 2001). 
Moreover, space for sharing information would be better established so 
possbility of suspicion that usually leads into conflict or competition can be 
avoided. One of the principles of GMN is to enhance security cooperations 
with great powers in order to secure the SLOC as it is crucial for all 
countries involved in the trade and investments there. So maritime vision 
could be helpful in mitigating the risk of heightened great power projections 
as all countries share same burden as well as opportunites through a formal 
partnership on the basis of maritime cooperations.  
 
Conclusion 
 South China Sea dispute is predicted to be a contested primacy zone 
for great power projections such as U.S. and China in order to gain their 
interests at stake in the region due to its potential resources. Security 
dilemma faced by sovereign states surrounding could possibly lead into two 
possibilities; either cooperation or competition. The South China Sea 
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dispute is somehow a test for all actors involved; for China it assesses their 
commitment to keep relying on the principle of ‘’China Peaceful Rise’’ 
without triggering any assertive competition, for United States it tests their 
limits on presenting ‘’U.S. Rebalance to Asia’’ without disrupting regional 
order, and last but not least for Indonesia to successfully achieve their 
national interests without being involved in worsening conflict escalation. 
This predicament has led Indonesia as one of regional prominent actors who 
commits to be non-claimant state to strive for a more cooperative solution in 
order to reduce the vulnerability of countries surrounding through its 
maritime vision formulated in Global Maritime Nexus (GMN). Despite 
challenges and opportunities, GMN could become a buffer solution to 
enhance unity among ASEAN members since some members become 
claimant states. Moreover, it would be a mutually beneficial solution for all 
states involved in the South China Sea dispute to possess shared 
opportunities due to the maritime cooperations that will allow them to have 
better transportation and information sharing systems to reduce the potential 
risk of great power dominion. Therefore, maritime vision invigorated by 
Indonesia could avoid the undesirable outcomes such as arms races by naval 
power as states will have a more formal space to know other intentions’ so 
that direct conflict in settling any dispute might slightly be reduced.  
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